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FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION OR MORE OF THE SAME?.
Michael W. Boyer*
I. Introduction
R ecently, the Obama Administration and the Federal Reserve
released a comprehensive regulatory reform proposal aimed
at preventing future financial crises like what the country
underwent in 2008.1 At first pass, the plan looks like sweeping
regulatory reform with a focus on protecting financial industry
consumers from future financial crises.2 The Administration's
proposal is ambitious in scope and detail, but it is not flawless. In
particular, two titles of the proposal, "Title II: Consolidated
Supervision and Regulation of Large, Interconnected Financial
Firms," and "Title X: Consumer Financial ProtectionAgency Act
of 2009" appear to protect the financial industry consumer;
however, these two titles end up serving divergent interests.
A. Scope
This note examines these two titles as parts of the whole
proposal in relation to prior regulatory attempts to control the
financial services industry. Before analyzing the specific
provisions of the reform plan, Part II of this note offers a
comprehensive background on the origins of the current financial
crisis. In particular, I focus on the relatively recent history of
.consolidation in the financial industry, with specificity on the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1 Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation,
available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/regulatoryreform.html. (last
modified Aug. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Financial Regulatory Reform].
2 Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 8 - 9 (2009) (explaining that the
crisis essentially began with the failure of Bear Stearns).
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creation of too big to fail ("TBTF") bank holding companies
("BHCs") like Citigroup. TBTF BHCs accelerated financial
industry consolidation in the late 1990s and early 2000s with
Congressional passage of the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
("GLB").3 GLB and the big bank lobby paved the way for
abusive banking practices that completely disregarded
consumers' best interest and essentially destabilized the world
economy in less than a decade. For the last twenty years,
financial institutions have sold the idea of industry consolidation
to consumers and regulators as a method to create economies of
scale that would ultimately lead to more choices and lower costs
for financial services consumers. Part II explains how the biggest
players in the banking industry in actuality disregarded consumer
interests. TBTF BHCs exploited faulty economic reasoning to
promote largesse and inefficiency for the purpose of taking on
excessive risk with the implicit knowledge that government
bailouts would be available if the system collapsed.
Part III of this note analyzes the specific provisions of the
reform proposal related to TBTF BHCs and consumers. I
compare these provisions to existing legislation and regulatory
agencies that failed to mitigate the risk and abuse that led to the
current banking crisis. The goal is to determine if the reform
proposal i) adequately addresses current weaknesses in the
financial industry regulatory framework, ii) provides sufficient
authority to enact change in an immensely powerful but
inherently flawed industry, and iii) if the reform proposal does
have the authority to change financial industry practices, will it
promote consumer interests? The explicit goal of the reform
proposal is to prevent future financial crises. To achieve this
goal, Title II of the proposal identifies a specific set of financial
institutions that likely constitute what today are considered
TBTF BHCs and labels them Tier 1 financial holding companies
("T1FHCs"). The proposal seeks to hold T1FHCs to a unique set
of regulations under a to-be-formed agency. Title II of the
proposal seeks to promote the financial health of T1FHCs
because the government has deemed them too big, important,
and/or interconnected to fail without dire consequences to the
overall stability of the United States economy. Moreover, Part III
of this note concludes that Title II ignores the latent consequences
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 219-20 (2002).
* See Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 1.
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consumers will bear as a result of focusing on the financial health
of T1FHCs. Title II implicitly authorizes future abusive practices
towards T1FHC customers to ensure their largesse and
inefficiency does not crumble and fail.
Part IV of this note explains what provisions the drafters
of the proposal got right, and what they got wrong. Part IV
compares Title II of the proposal to Title X, which addresses
consumer protection. This section of the note addresses whether
there are sufficient provisions in place to protect the consumer
under the Consumer Protection Act of 2009 to overpower the
likely latent consequences of Title II. Ultimately, I conclude that
neither Title II nor X has sufficient authority to adequately
dismantle the current TBTF financial regime. Title II attempts
to control it, but is likely to fail because it does not provide
disincentives nor does it disallow TBTF status. The result of this
will be a continued erosion of consumer banking conditions and
an ever-present threat of financial calamity.
B. The Financial Services Consumer
The new financial regulations have the potential to impact
consumers in two different ways. First, a new regulatory scheme
will impact financial industry consumers directly due to changes
financial institutions make to comply with new regulations.
Second, there will be an impact to the consumer as a taxpayer
because the reform plan calls for a great deal of government
oversight that will require tax financing.'
This note defines a financial services consumer as anyone
who has a bank account, credit card, insurance policy, mortgage,
or any type of retirement or investment account. Because of the
depth and breadth of the financial services industry, this list is
not exhaustive. This definition includes most Americans. It is
important to understand the many ways individuals are financial
industry consumers because, when dealing with T1FHCs, an
institution may offer services in all of these categories. A single
Title X calls for fees on 'covered persons'-meaning financial
institutions-to pay for the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency.
However, it is unclear if fee revenue will be able to meet the burden of the
agency's costs. Additionally, Title II does not clearly address where funding
will come from. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R.
3126, 111th Cong. § 1018 (2009) available at
http://www.financialstabilitv.gov/docs/CFPA-Act.pdf
(last modified Aug. 11, 2009).
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T1FHC may offer its services to a significant percentage of the
entire U.S. population. With one financial institution affecting
this many individuals, it is important to understand the goals of
the institution. It is equally important to understand the
government's ability to regulate a company that is so significant
to the economy that it will not be allowed to fail.
II. History
Two decades of industry consolidation have resulted in a
few massive TBTF financial holding companies controlling a
disproportionate amount of the industry. The government first
fostered the growth of TBTF companies by relaxing federal
banking regulations in the 1990s. The government then provided
bailout money on an unprecedented scale during the 2008
financial crisis, which promoted more consolidation as smaller
banks failed and got absorbed by TBTF financial companies. In
fact, during the height of the financial crisis, Henry Paulson, then
Treasury Secretary, encouraged TBTF bailout recipients to pair
up with one another, which ultimately created some of the largest
banks the country has known.6 This section begins with a brief
history of financial industry consolidation during the 1990s,
which was a period of relaxed regulatory standards that
promoted consolidation at historic levels leading to Citigroup's
creation. I then discuss how financial industry consolidation
produces diseconomies of scale for TBTF banks, which creates a
host of problems for consumers. Next, I explain the banks'
motivations for achieving TBTF status, despite the substantial
evidence indicating efficiencies are not achieved through
consolidation. Finally, I briefly address the consolidation frenzy
that occurred during and immediately after the 2008 TARP
bailout.
A. Financial Industry Consolidation
Financial industry. consolidation accelerated rapidly in the
6 James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle to Save the American
Financial System, THE NEW YORKER Sept. 21, 2009, at 74. (at the apex of the
financial crisis, consolidation accelerated at the Fed's encouragement, which
was something of a knee-jerk response to a problem that the Fed's leaders did
not fully understand. John Mack., CEO of Morgan Stanley was instructed by
Timothy Geithner and Henry Paulson to "follow the lead of Merrill Lynch and
find a partner." Three days earlier, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America
agreed to merge).
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1990s. 7 The culmination of financial industry consolidation was
the creation of Citigroup, the largest financial holding company
to that point.' Shortly after the Citigroup merger, Congress
passed the GLB, which permitted financial holding companies
like Citigroup to acquire both banking and non-banking financial
institutions.9 The GLB's passage effectively represented the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which was instituted to
separate financial institutions 'by service type. 10 The Glass-
Steagall Act was a response to the financial crisis that brought
about the Great Depression. 1 Its goal was to break apart
financial conglomerates and force separate companies for
commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance
businesses." However, decades later new legislation slowly began
to erode the barriers set forth in Glass-Steagall and clever
attorneys for banks exploited loopholes that led to preliminary
consolidation within the industry. 13 In the late-1990s a powerful
bank lobby convinced Congress that permitting cross-sector
financial holding company consolidation would produce
economies of scale that would benefit both banks and
7 See Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 219-20.
8 Mitchell Martin, Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record 70
Billion Deal: A New No. 1: Financial Giants Unite, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1998,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/l1998/04/07/news/O7iht-citi.t.html.
I Wilmarth,. supra note 3, at .219-20 ("The GLB Act removed legal
restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms by repealing two
provisions of... the "Glass-Steagall Act." The GLB Act also eliminated legal
barriers to affiliations between banks and insurance companies. As a result of
the GLB Act, banks can combine with securities firms and insurance
companies to organize financial conglomerates under the structure of a
"financial holding company").
10 Id.
"I Jonathan Zubrow Cohen, The Mellon Bank Order: An Unjustifiable
Expansion of Banking Powers, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.U 335, 337 (1994)
(explaining the origins of the Glass-Steagall Act: "Congress enacted four
sections of the ... Glass-Steagall Act to deal with its concern that banks, prior
to the Great Depression, had invested customer deposits heavily in securities
activities leading to many subsequent bank failures. The Act's primary
purpose was to separate commercial and investment banking to ensure that
these types of failures would not happen again").
12 Id. See also, Eric Hsu, Downsizing Citigroup: End of an Era or Bump
in the Road for Graham-Leach-Bliley?, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 404, 405-
06 (2009) (a general discussion on the Glass-Steagall Act's intented goals).
13 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 437-38 (discussing how even before the GLB
Act was passed, banks created a "substantial presence" in non-depository
financial services by "exploiting regulatory loopholes in the Glass-Steagall
Act").
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consumers. 4 Scholars conclude that the GLB merely legitimized
the consolidation that was already ongoing in the financial
industry."5  With GLB's passage, financial institution
consolidation began in earnest.
Banks argue that consolidation creats market efficiencies
and economies of scale that ultimately benefit consumers through
better service and lower fees. 6 Based on legislative trends, the
government seems to agree with the big banks' consolidation
argument. After 1980, the Justice Department significantly-
relaxed merger standards, and since then has rarely denied
banks' requests to merge.18 Between 1990 and 2002 there were
thirty mergers among very large financial institutions. 9 In 1998
alone, there were three mergers announced between six of the
nation's twelve largest banks.20 This consolidation resulted in
decreased competition and a disproportionate increase in market
share dominance by the largest financial institutions. 2 Despite
this decrease in competition and increased market share control,
big bank champions claimed consumers would reap a wide
variety of benefits from financial industry consolidation.22
B. Diseconomies of Scale
The financial industry's goals over the last two decades
14 Discussing the powerful bank lobby, Id. at 307 ("During 1997-99, the
financial services industry, led by the largest banks, securities firms and
insurance companies, reportedly spent more than $300 million on lobbying
expenses and political contributions to secure passage of the GLB Act");
Discussing arguments made by banking consolidation advocates about the
purported benefits of consolidation, Id. at 282 ("Advocates for big banks
content that large diversified financial institutions can generate economies of
scale and scope by selling a variety of consumer financial products").
15 Id. at 475.
16 Id. at 223.
17 Wilmarth, supra note 3.
18 Id. at 250-51.
'9 Id. at 252.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 252-54 (mergers resulted in the "fifty largest banks increase[ing]
their share of the banking industry's assets from 55% in 1989 to 74% in
1999... all of this growth occurred among the ten largest banks, as their
combined market share rose from 26% to 49% of total industry assets during
the 1990s" and "[b]y 2000, 50% or more of the deposits in each of twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia were controlled by the five largest banks in
the jurisdiction").
22 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 282.
Vol. 2 2:2
Financial Regulatory Reforn
have been clear: consolidation is king. To further consolidation,
banks lobbied for new legislation relaxing standards previously
established as a response to the Great Depression.23 To justify
consolidation practices, big bank proponents argued that larger
banks would create financial supermarkets where consumers
would reap the benefits of maximum economies of scale.24
However, while financial industry. consolidation did create super-
sized financial holding companies, these institutions, in turn,
produced diseconomies of scale.2" Consumers paid higher fees for
worse customer service and had fewer choices of where to bank
in many markets.2 6 Further, these super-sized financial holding
companies did not realize market efficiencies. Instead,
acquisition costs and other ancillary charges associated with
managing behemoth corporations actually resulted in smaller
profits for these institutions.28 Even as consolidation ramped up
23 Cohen, supra note 11, at 337.
24 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 283.
25 Id. at 279-80 ("most economic studies have concluded that U.S. banks
stop producing increasing returns to scale as they grow beyond the $10-$25
billion size range... FDIC data show that banks in the $1-$10 billion size
range operate with better efficiency ratios than those registered by bigger
banks." To put this into perspective, the largest bailout recipients in 2008
received more money from the government than the high-end figure used in
this Wilmarth article to demonstrate the point at which banks no longer yield
efficiencies).
26 Id. at 275-76 (when First Union merged with CoreStates it implemented
a plan to push consumers towards electronic services and away from in-person
banking. Customers responded by leaving: "First Union ultimately lost a fifth
of CoreStates' former depositors." Similarly, After Wells Fargo's hostile
takeover of First Interstate Bank, it pushed customers out of traditional bank
branches in an effort to cut costs. The "impersonal treatment offended many
patrons, resulting in a loss of one-eighth of its retail deposit based and a sharp
decline in its revenues"); Discussing market share dominance to over charge
consumers, "numerous studies have found that banks in highly concentrated
local markets pay below-average interest rates on consumer deposits and
charge above-average interest rates on loans to consumers and small
businesses. Another study concluded ... competition from small local
banks... had only a minor restraining effect on the dominant banks" and
"[n]ational surveys have shown that the largest banks pay interest rates on
deposits that are substantially lower than the rates paid by smaller banks.
Studies have also found that large, multistate banks charge fees on deposit
accounts that are significantly higher than fees assessed by small community
banks". Id. at 294-95.
27 Id. at 2 79-80.
21 Id. at 272 (discussing profitability issues for the largest banks:
"Economic studies have generally shown that large bank mergers in the United
States during the 1980s and 1990s did not improve overall efficiency or
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in the 1990s and continued to increase even through the 2008
financial crisis, big banks never realized their much-lauded
economies of scale. This has also meant that consumers never
experienced the purported benefits used to justify consolidation
in the first place. However, as the next section details, large banks
were consolidating for other, less altruistic motives in spite of
inefficiencies they realized from their mergers.
C. TBTF's Allure
Despite significant data proving diseconomies of scale for
extremely large financial institutions, banks continued to pursue
a consolidation policy because they were motivated in part by
attaining TBTF status. TBTF status offers the protection of an
implicit government guarantee because a financial institution's
failure poses such a risk to the overall health of the economy that
it cannot be allowed to fail. 29  As a matter of survival in
competitive markets, banks have a strong incentive to pursue
TBTF status even though such a pursuit creates inefficiencies,
largesse, and suboptimal banking conditions for the average
consumer.
30
Perhaps unwittingly, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA") codified
TBTF status and offered guidelines for acquiring federal bailout
money.3' The FDICIA did two things: i) it encouraged financial
institutions to consolidate in an effort to reach TBTF status, and
ii) it encouraged excessive leveraging and risk-taking for financial
institutions that achieved TBTF status. Essentially, by
acknowledging that some financial firms were deemed so
necessary to the economy's functioning that the government
profitability of the resulting banks.... In thirteen of the fifteen largest bank
mergers of 1997-98, the resulting banks failed to meet their profit targets for
1999.... As with bank merger studies, corporate acquisition reviews have
concluded that most acquiring firms paid takeover premiums that exceeded
the value of any performance improvements that could be realized from
expected postmerger 'synergies"').
29 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 353.
30 Id. at 296.
31 Id. at 300 ("Section 141 of FDICIA authorizes the FDIC to protect
uninsured depositors and other creditors in a large failing bank if such action is
needed to prevent "serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial
stability." This is in stark contrast to the general FDIC policy that places
failing banks into receivership where assets are sold off and management is
fired).
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would be required to bail them out, the government offered a
type of free implicit insurance to a select group of institutions
while at the same time authorized them to act carelessly in
balancing risk. The result of this was an increased market share
by very large banks and more importantly, a dramatic increase in
the amount of risk the largest banks were willing to assume.33
Throughout the late 1990s and increasingly into the 2000s,
large financial institutions assumed a disproportionate amount of
risk when compared to small ones.34 Large financial institutions
had both the power and the incentive to dive deeper into risk
than their predecessors and smaller counterparts. Large banking
institutions have a huge incentive to achieve TBTF status
because an implicit bailout guarantee by the government helps
TBTF banks subsidize their risk.35  TBTF status equals a
government subsidy because certain banks are able to build an
implied bailout* into the cost of their risky actions.36 Therefore,
TBTF banks are able to leverage themselves more than
traditional banks because they need not build the same risk
premium into their asset cushion.37 Generally accepted banking
32 Id. at 316.
13 Id.; See also David Cho, Banks 'Too Big to Fail' Have Grown Even
Bigger, THE WASH. POST Aug. 28, 2009 at AO1.
11 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 316, 373-74. ("[B]ig banks have pursued risky
business strategies since 1993" and "big banks have relied on proprietary
trading and portfolio investments to produce a growing share of their
revenues. Much of this trading and investing has occurred in high-risk
areas... Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of America derived a significant and
growing percentage of their revenues from [such trading]").
11 Id. at 301-02 ("TBTF policy also subsidizes the cost of uninsured
deposits for the largest banks, because market participants expect the FDIC to
use its "systemic risk" authority to protect all deposits held by big banks").
36 Id. at 300-01 ("TBTF status confers significant benefits on big banks.
Studies have shown that, compared to smaller banks, the largest banks operate
with lower capital ratios, higher percentages of uninsured deposits, lower
levels of core deposits, higher percentages of loans, and lower levels of cash
and marketable securities").
17 Id. at 353. Instead, TBTF banks take advantage of their implied
government safety net and commit to riskier investments that during good
times return higher profits for investors and shareholders. Wilmarth's article,
published in 2002 would turn out to be eerily prophetic: "The major U.S.
dealers in [over the counter] derivatives are the nation's largest banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies .... Federal regulators would
probably intervene to prevent the failure of any major derivatives dealer due
to concerns that such an event would trigger a systemic crisis in the financial
markets.... [The nation's largest banks] have a strong temptation to exploit
the federal safety net's implicit subsidy by engaging in speculative trading." Id.
2009
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standards call for leveraging of ten to' one or less, which means
for every one hundred dollars a bank loans out, it has at least ten
dollars on hand to cover the debt. By the time the market
collapsed in 2008, large financial institutions had leveraged
themselves by a ratio of thirty to one, meaning that for every
dollar the bank had on hand, it held thirty more in debt.38 This
risk level proved unsustainable.
Banks also seek TBTF status to control market share and
decrease competition. Instead of creating all-out monopolies,
large, interconnected financial institutions have succeeded in
creating oligopolies that serve common interests to these financial
institutions at inflated costs to consumers. 39 Further, research has
shown that big banks engage in "mutual forbearance" in setting
prices in markets in which they compete against each other.40
Mutual forbearance results in small banks being unable to
compete against big banks in specific markets because large
banks artificially maintain lower fee structures until smaller
banks are forced to bow out of a given market.4' Additionally, the
government has made it easier for large banks to hang on to the
customers they lure away from smaller banks by "permitting
discounts that reward customers for purchasing multiple
products from a single bank.'4  On top of that, TBTF banks
utilize their technical advantage to dissuade consumers from
switching banks by using discount incentives to get customers to
enroll in bundled financial services and direct deposit which,
"make[s] it more difficult for the customer to transfer a deposit
relationship to another institution. '43 In short, these government
incentives promote largesse and inefficiency in the financial
industry. These regulatory policies have driven banks to achieve
TBTF status. Historically, the cost to the consumer for TBTF
status seems to be similar to that of monopolies: increased cost,
38 Stewart, supra note 6, at 60.
31 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 299 ("[M]ergers enable large universal banks
to capture long-term oligopoly pricing power in retail markets, consolidation
will significantly harm the interests of consumer").
40 Id. at 296 (discussing large bank pricing motives: "preliminary evidence
indicating that large, multistate banks increase their profits by forbearing from
aggressive price competition in markets that they share with other banks. This
tentative evidence of "mutual forbearance" suggests that major banks may
exercise joint price leadership in local or regional areas where they hold
significant market positions").
41 Id.
42 Id. at 298.
43 Id.
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decreased choices, and bad service. Clearly, for banks, there is a
strong allure to TBTF status.
D. 2008 Banking Crisis Further Accelerates Consolidation
A full discussion of the events that led up to last year's
banking crisis exceeds the scope of this note. Here, I focus on the
consolidation that occurred within the financial industry as a
result of the crisis. Below is a brief synopsis of the unprecedented
consolidation that occurred within the financial industry during
and immediately following the height of the banking crisis.
Even though TBTF financial institutions are largely
responsible for the 2008 banking crisis, these institutions were
bailed out by the federal government at unprecedented levels. In
September 2008, Congress authorized a $700 billion bailout
program that was used primarily to make direct capital injections
into TBTF financial institutions." Access to these funds
prevented TBTF banks like Citigroup and Bank of America
from going into FDIC receivership like comparatively smaller
banks such as Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and IndyMac. 45 In
fact, Citigroup and Bank of America received capital injections
above and beyond what was initially distributed to them under
TARP.46 Both banks received an additional $20 billion in
government preferred stock purchase investments .4  Bank of
America's need for additional bailout funds resulted from its
consolidation efforts at the height of the crisis. Bank of America
absorbed the highly troubled bank Countrywide, and then
brokered a deal to merge with Merrill Lynch with the
government's blessing. 8  Bank of America merged their
comparatively good assets with the. highly toxic ones of
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch and suddenly found itself in a
perilous position where extraordinary bailout funds were
necessary to keep it from failing. Government action in 2008
44 DANIEL GROSS, DUMB MONEY: How OUR GREATEST FINANCIAL
MINDS BANKRUPTED THE NATION 3 (2009) ("Congress approved a $700
billion bailout of the nation's financial system. But Treasury Secretary Henry
M. Paulson's plan to deploy that cash to buy toxic mortgages was quickly
abandoned in favor of injecting funds directly into large banks").
45 Id.
46 Lissa L. Broome, Extraordinary Government Intervention to Bolster
Bank Balance Sheets, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 137, 141-42 (2009).
47 Id.
48 GROSS, supra note 44, at 88.
41 Id. at 89 ("By January 2009, it was clear that Bank of America buying
2009
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quickly defined which financial institutions were TBTF, and
these institutions used their power to create favorable outcomes
for themselves.
TBTF bailout recipients used their privileged positions to
swallow comparatively smaller banks reeling from the credit
collapse. This resulted in even fewer banking options for
consumers, and further entrenchment of the TBTF ideology in
the financial industry. When the dust settled from the stock
market panic in early 2009, the new financial landscape revealed
clear winners. J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells
Fargo together controlled three of every ten dollars on deposit in
United States bank accounts.5 0  Further, when including
Citigroup with the aforementioned, these four TBTF financial
institutions issued half of all mortgages and roughly two thirds of
all credit cards in the U.S."l Two of the largest depository
institutions acquired investment banks on the cheap because of
the crisis: Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch, 2 and J.P.
Morgan Chase absorbed Bear Stearns' remaining good assets for
ten dollars per share. 3  TBTF financial institutions took
advantage of market conditions and used taxpayer bailout dollars
to fund even more industry consolidation.
The 2008 financial crisis worsened the banking
environment for consumers. First, federal regulators relaxed anti-
trust standards for large banks as a result of the crisis, allowing
some banks "to hold more than 10 percent of the nation's
deposits" even though this is prohibited by law. * Additionally,
J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America were permitted to
exceed Department of Justice antitrust guidelines for market
share domination in several metropolitan regions.55 Large banks
can now use relaxed regulatory standards to saturate select
markets, which has. resulted in consumers now having fewer
banking options.5 6 Relaxed regulatory standards also results in
Merrill was like a boat taking on water believing it could save itself by lashing
to another ship that was filling up with concrete").
"0 Cho, supra note 33, at A01.
51 Id.
52 GROSS, supra note 44, at 89.
"3 Id. at 84. ("Henry Paulson hammered out a deal for JPMorgan Chase to
access credit from the Federal Reserve to buy [Bear Stearns] at a bargain-
basement price of $2 per share (later revised upward to $10 a share)").
14 Cho, supra note 33, at A01.
55 Id.
56 Id. ("In Santa Cruz, Calif., Wells Fargo, Bank of America and J.P.
Morgan Chase hold three-quarters of the deposit market").
Vol. 2 2:2
Financial Regulatory Reform
suboptimal banking conditions for consumers, especially when it
comes to account fees.5 7
In sum, four TBTF financial institutions emerged from
the 2008 crisis with a clear advantage over non-TBTF banks.
These banks received extraordinary bailout support from the
government. They used their privileged status and bailout money
to increase their market share in the industry, and the
government largely ratified these bank's actions by relaxing
antitrust standards. Consumers are already experiencing the
negative consequences from post-crisis consolidation.
E. Historical Summary
Banking industry consolidation produced suboptimal
results for the consumer. To afford costly mergers, giant banks
began cutting services at branches in an attempt to force
customers into electronic banking." More consolidation also
meant fewer choices for consumers, particularly in urban areas.59
Ultimately, large banks caught on to their dominant market
positions and responded by abusing consumers. Large banks
with less competition in urban markets charged their customers
more fees, higher interest rates on loans, and paid a lower interest
yield on consumer savings and checking accounts.6 °
Despite taking advantage of their market dominance,
large banks did not perform as well as small and midsized banks
in the early 2000s.6' However, the stability provided by TBTF
status compelled additional consolidation, and for those banks
that had achieved such status, there was what seemed to be an
unquenchable thirst for leverage and investment in unregulated
financial products.
III. Reform Proposal
The Obama Administration and the U.S. Department of
the Treasury introduced an ambitious plan to prevent future
financial crises in a white paper called "Financial Regulatory
51 Id. ("In the last quarter, the top four banks raised fees related to
deposits by an average of 8 percent, according to research from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Striving to stay competitive, smaller banks lowered
their fees by an average of 12 percent").
5 Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 2 74-76.
5 Id. at 239.
60 Id. at 293-96.
61 Id. at 2 72-79.
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Reform, A New Foundation. 62 This white paper outlines the
goals of an extensive set of new regulations released at the same
time.63 In broad terms, the administration plans to consolidate
financial regulatory power under the Federal Reserve and
expand its reach and authority beyond its current reach of
BHCs. 64 This note examines the plan within this white paper and
corresponding regulations to create a Financial Services
Oversight Council to regulate TBTF financial entities, which the
administration has renamed T1FHCs. 6 Additionally, this note
examines the white paper section and corresponding regulatory
proposal for creating a new consumer financial protection agency
under the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009.
This section examines interactions between these two
areas of the Proposal. First, I identify the specific language in
Title II that deals with defining T1FHCs and explain why this is
a mere extension of previous TBTF policy and a further implicit
guarantee of government intervention. Second, I examine the
prudential standard requirements set forth in Title II. These
prudential standards are crafted to attempt to prevent the need
for future government bailouts by promoting greater
transparency and requiring T1FHCs to be well managed and
well capitalized.66 Third, this section compares these provisions to
existing legislation and regulatory agencies that failed to mitigate
risk and abuse, which led to the current banking crisis. The goal
is to determine if the reform proposal i) adequately addresses
current weaknesses in the financial industry regulatory
framework, ii) provides sufficient authority to enact change in an
immensely powerful, but inherently flawed industry, and iii)
promotes consumer interests.
A. Definitions
The reform proposal introduces a new term: Tier 1
Financial Holding Company. I assert that this term is a less
62 DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FINANcIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, 21(2009)
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/final report-web.pdf.
63 Id.
64 DEP'T OF THE TREAS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY MODERNIZATION
ACT OF 2009 available at
http://www.financialstanility.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/07222009/titlell.pdf
[hereinafter BHC Act 2009].
65 Id. at § 2 03(t).
66 BHC Act 2009, supra note 64, at § 202.
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politically charged way of saying too big to fail financial
institution. The white paper proposes heightened consolidated
supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve and the to-be-
created Financial Services Oversight Council ("FSOC") of "all
large, interconnected financial firms. 6 7 Title II-Consolidated
Supervision and Regulation of Large, Interconnected Financial
Firms of the proposal ("Title II") offers a general definition of
T1FHCs at Section 6(a)(1)(A) where it gives the FSOC authority
to designate a financial institution as a T1FHC when it
"determines that material financial distress at the company could
pose a threat to global or United States financial stability...
during times of economic stress."68
Title II further enumerates 'criteria the FSOC may
consider in determining whether a financial institution meets
criteria for T1FHC status during times of economic stress.
Sections 6(a)(1)(A)(i) through (vii) are a non-exhaustive list of
criteria the FSOC can use to make a T1FHC determination such
as: the amount of a company's holdings and liabilities, reliance on
short term funding, the company's interaction and transactions
with other companies, and the company's importance to the
financial system.69
Additionally, Title II includes a set of standards for
classifying a financial institution as a T1FHC at any point based
on data collected by the FSOC. Generally, if a financial
institution has at least $10 billion in assets, at least $100 billion in
assets under management, or at least $2 billion in gross annual
revenue, the FSOC can designate the institution a T1FHC.7° Per
Title II, the FSOC will collect a variety of data on financial
67 DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 21 (2009)
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
61 BHC Act 2009, supra note 64, at §6(a)(1)(A).
69 Id. §6(a)(1)(A)(i)-(vii) (specifically, the FSOC is permitted to consider the
following criteria to designate T1FHC status during times of economic stress:
"(i) the amount and nature of the company's financial assets; (ii) the amount
and types of the company's liabilities, including the degree of reliance on short-
term funding; (iii) the extent of the company's off-balance sheet exposures; (iv)
the extent of the company's transactions and relationships with other major
financial companies; (v) the company's importance as a source of credit for
households, business and State and local governments and as a source of
liquidity for the financial system; (vi) the recommendation, if any, of the
Financial Services Oversight Council; and (vii) any other factors that the
Board deems appropriate").
10 Id. at § 6(a)(2)(A)
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institutions to determine whether they fit the profile of a
T1FHC.7'
B. Prudential Standards
In an attempt to prevent the need for future taxpayer
bailouts of TIFHCs, Title II sets a series of heightened prudential
standards that are stricter than the standards ordinary financial
institutions will have to comply with under these new
regulations.12 After being deemed a TIFHC by the Board, the
financial institution has 180 days comply with the prudential
standards set forth in this proposal.73 The prudential standards
set forth include, but are not limited to: minimum capital
requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, and risk
management requirements.74  These prudential standards
represent a response to a lack of cohesive regulatory authority
over TBTF financial institutions prior to the 2008 crisis. By
implementing such standards and giving regulatory agencies the
requisite authority to monitor and enforce compliance, these
standards attempt to mitigate future bailout needs for T1FHCs.
However, as discussed in part IV of .this note, these requirements
will produce a suboptimal banking environment for the average
consumer because prudential requirements detailed in Section 6A
of Title II encourage consumer abuse.
Title II, Section 6A defines minimal capital requirements,
leverage limits, liquidity requirements, and risk management
requirements for T1FHCs. The FSOC Board shall determine
capital requirements for each T1FHC.75 Additionally, the Board
will be responsible for setting leverage limits and monitoring.
T1FHCs to ensure compliance.7 6 Section 6A also restricts all
71 Id. at § 6(d).
72 Id. at § 6(c)(1) (explaining: "prudential standards shall be more stringent
that the standards applicable to bank holding companies to reflect the
potential risk posed to financial stability by United States Tier 1 financial
holding companies").
71 Id. at § 6(b).
71 Id. at § 6(c)(1)(A)-(D).
" BHC Act 2009, supra note 64, at § 6A(c)(2) (explaining: "The Board
shall, by regulation, specify for each relevant capital measure the levels at
which a Tier 1 financial holding company is well capitalized, undercapitalized,
and significantly undercapitalized").
76 Id. at §6A(c)(3) (here, the Proposal sets a floor for the Board in
determining leverage limits when a T1FHC reaches an undercapitalized stage:
"The Board shall, by regulation, specify the ratio of tangible equity to total
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capital distributions by T1FHCs that are not in compliance with
minimum capital requirements, but provides an exception where
such a distribution would improve the T1FHC's financial
health.7  This suggests a policy of permitting a TBTF
organization to save itself despite regulations implemented to
punish bad behavior, and suggests that preserving the T1FHC is
the priority of this Act.
Additionally, Title II requires T1FHCs to be "well
capitalized and well managed. 78 Title II defines a T1FHC as
well capitalized "if it exceeds the required minihum level for each
relevant capital measure.7 9 While this definition is vague, it
maintains that T1FHCs are well capitalized if they meet the
capital standards set forth in subsection 'c' of Section 6A of Title
11.8' However, the majority of these capital standards are to be set
by the to-be-formed FSOC Board, so there is no way to fully
assess their effectiveness until after the reform package is signed
into law. Title II lacks an adequate definition of what it means
for a T1FHC to be well capitalized.
If the Board determines that a T1FHC is undercapitalized
and a capital restoration plan is needed, the T1FHC's
management is responsible for submitting the plan and, if they
fail to do so, they can be removed by the FSOC. s1 This seems to
be the only section in Title II that specifically holds management
responsible for their actions and it only permits removal if, after
running the T1FHC poorly, the management team fails to submit
an appropriate plan to correct the institution's capital issues. The
way Title II treats these requirements as a whole indicates a
strong status-quo bias by the Proposal's drafters. This is bad for
the consumer because it suggests that it will take a fairly high
degree of negligence by corporate officers at T1FHCs before the
regulatory agencies will intervene, which is not all that different
than what consumers have now.
assets at which a Tier 1 financial holding company is critically
undercapitalized... Leverage Limit Range... shall require tangible equity in
the amount--(i) not less than 2 percent of total assets; and.., not more than 65
percent of the required minimum level of capital under the leverage limit").
71 Id. at § 6A(d).
71 Id. at § 6(c)(5).
79 Id. at § 6A(b)(1)(A).
s Id. at § 6(c).
I d. at § 6A(f)(2)(E).
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C. Accountability
The regulatory reform proposal includes heightened
corrective action measures for T1FHCs, but its focus is reactive
when it should be preventative. Section 6A of Title II governs
corrective action for T1FHCs. Essentially, the reform proposal
requires the FSOC Board to take prompt action to motivate a
failing T1FHC to recapitalize itself. Section 6A sets forth a
variety of standards T1FHCs must comply with and the
consequences for failing to comply. Pertinent elements of Section
6A are detailed below because they demonstrate how the
regulatory reform proposal insufficiently addresses the root
problems of too big to fail in the financial industry. Further,
Section 6A lays groundwork for encouraging T1FHCs to turn to
abusive banking practices in an effort to comply with the
regulatory standards proposed.
Section 6A requires .the FSOC Board take "prompt
corrective action" against problematic T1FHCs 2 Section 6A
then goes on to outline minimum capital requirements that
TiFHCs must maintain to avoid corrective action from the
FSOC. Specifically, the reform proposal cites the capital
requirements established in the BHC along with leverage limits
and risk-based capital requirements.83 Additionally, the FSOC
Board is permitted to craft additional measures that further the
goals of Section 6A.84 Basically, the majority of the progressive
standards the reform plan seeks to establish will not be known
until the proposal becomes law and the FSOC Board determines
what the standards should be.
Additionally, Section 6A mandates that troubled T1FHCs
create "capital restoration plans. '85 Generally, Title II calls for an
undercapitalized T1FHC to submit a capital restoration plan to
the FSOC Board. 6 The proposal is not overly forthcoming in
what constitutes an undercapitalized T1FHC. It defines a
T1FHC as undercapitalized when it "fails to meet the required
minimum level for any relevant capital measure. 8 7 The capital
measures that this definition refers to are to be set by the FSOC
Board. An adequate capital restoration plan will contain steps the
82 BHC Act 2009, supra note 64, at § 6A(a).
s Id. at § 6A(c)(1)(A).
14 Id. at § 6A(c)(1)(B).
Id. at § 6A(e)(2).
I6 id. at § 6A(e)(2)(A).
17 BHC Act 2009, supra note 64, at § 6A(b)(1)(B).
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undercapitalized T1FHC will' take to regain well-capitalized
status, specific annual goals the undercapitalized T1FHC will
meet to recapitalize, and how the T1FHC will comply with the
Board's requirements. 8 It is only when an undercapitalized
T1FHC fails to submit a sufficient capital restoration plan that
the Board will take additional corrective measures. These
potential additional measures include removing management or
requiring divestiture.8 9
Section 6A also contains a mandatory bankruptcy
provision, but only if the T1FHC is 'critically under capitalized. 90
The Proposal defines critically undercapitalized as failing to meet
an FSOC Board-determined leverage threshold for a ratio of
tangible equity to total assets.91  If the- Board determines a
T1FHC has become critically undercapitalized, it shall require
the T1FHC to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.92  This is perhaps
the strongest corrective provision in the reform plan for T1FHCs.
However, it still falls short because it fails to define what the
threshold is for 'critically undercapitalized.' It also fails because
there is nothing in the reform plan indicating the government will
not intervene before a T1FHC reaches critically undercapitalized
status as long as the company submits an adequate capital
restoration plan. In sum, accountability measures enumerated in
Title I lack the strength to effectively discipline T1FHCs.
D. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009
The Obama Administration has also proposed creating a
s Id. at § 6A(e)(2)(B).
89 For removing management, see Bank Holding Company Modernization
Act of 2009 § 6A(f)(2)(E) ("Improving Management.-Doing one or more of the
following-(i) New election of directors.-Ordering a new election for the Tier
1 financial holding company's board of directors. (ii) Dismissing directors or
senior executive officers. Requiring the Tier 1 financial holding company to
dismiss from office any director or senior executive officer who had held office
for more than 180 days immediately before the Tier 1 financial holding
company became undercapitalized."). For requiring divestiture, see Bank
Holding Company Modernization Act of 2009 § 6A(f)(2)(F) ("Requiring the
Tier 1 financial holding company to divest itself of or liquidate any subsidiary
if the Board determines that the subsidiary is in danger of becoming insolvent,
poses a significant risk to the Tier 1 financial holding company, or is likely to
cause a significant dissipation of the Tier 1 financial holding company's assets
or earnings").
90 Id. at § 6A(h).
11 Id. at § 6A(c)(3)(A).
2 Id. at § 6A(h)(1).
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new consumer protection agency under Title X of the
administration's regulatory reform proposal. While well-
intentioned, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of
2009 inadequately addresses the threat TBTF financial
institutions present to the consumer. Title X's goal is to prevent
future credit crises like the one born from the housing market
collapse of 2007-08. It seeks to accomplish this through rigorous
federal regulation that promotes increased "transparency,
simplicity, fairness, accountability, and access in the market for
consumer financial products or services."93 Title X has a clear
regulatory objective of ensuring consumers understand
information about financial products and services so they can
make responsible decisions while being protected from unfair or
deceptive practices.94 However, Title X does not include any
specific protection for consumers against oligopolistic tendencies
of TBTF financial institutions.
The reform plan attempts to manage the risk that any one
T1FHC can pose to the overall health of the economy by
mandating a set of elevated prudential standards and imposing
various corrective actions for violators. Such a system will not
benefit the consumer. T1FHCs will need to work hard to meet
the proposed prudential standards, which will lead to poor
banking conditions at these institutions. Further, Title II does not
contain a plan to eliminate TBTF status for these companies.
Instead, Title II ratifies T1FHCs' largesse and implicitly agrees
to support it so long as a set of vaguely-defined requirements are
met. Title X adequately addresses credit transparency and
predatory lending practices, but completely fails to protect the
consumer from the TBTF dangers outlined in the history section
of this note. The bottom line is that this proposal fails to cure the
underlying issues presented by TBTF financial institutions that
were occurring long before the 2008 financial crisis.
IV. Analysis
The regulatory reform proposal contains many strengths.
Particularly, it makes a genuine effort to consolidate regulatory
power in the financial industry to eliminate legal loopholes,
increase transparency, and reduce inefficiencies. The proposal
also contains impressive consumer protections, which are tailored
to prevent future abusive lending practices and promote
H.R. 3126, at § 102 1(a).
4 Id. at § 1021(b).
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transparency in the financial industry. However, there is a logical
flaw between the goals asserted under regulating T1FHCs and
protecting consumers as set forth in the reform proposal. That
flaw is the implicit authorization by the government to
implement abusive consumer practices by T1FHCs. The
prudential standards summarized in the white paper and detailed
in Title II are troublesome in that they will encourage large banks
to innovate new ways of meeting capital requirements. On its
face, this may not seem like a bad idea, but it potentially has
grave impacts for consumers.
This note has already established that TBTF financial
institutions,. T1FHCs-to-be, have a track record of higher
operating costs resulting from diseconomies of scale. Further,
excessive debt leveraging drove profits posted by T1FHCs from
2002 to 2007.95 Therefore, the profitable years leading up to the
collapse of the credit and housing markets were illusory because
these profits were attained through unsustainable banking
practices.96 Once 'the music stopped,' any sense that TBTF
financial institutions achieved real profits eroded as banks
assumed losses that exceeded all reasonable expectations." It
remains to be seen, but it is improbable, that compliance with the
prudential standards set forth in the proposal would give banks
the profit avenues they have previously enjoyed. Consequently,
T1FHCs will have to raise capital by other methods. They will
do so by charging consumers high fees and interest rates.98
The financial crisis and recession of the last two years has
shuttered many small banks.9 Additionally, a latent consequence
11 Louise Story & Eric Dash, Banks Are Likely to Hold Tight to Bailout
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008.
96 Story & Dash, supra note 95 ("For every dollar the banks earned during
the industry's most prosperous years, they have now wiped out $1.06").
97 Michivo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on
Buy-outs, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2007, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50- 1ldc-82 lc-0000779fd2ac.html
(quoting Citigroup's former CEO Chuck Prince regarding profits the bank
was making due to over leveraging: "When the music stops, in terms of
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing,
you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing").
98 Unfortunately, the regulatory reform proposal explicitly restricts the
authority of the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency to regulate
usurious lending. Consumer Fincancial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R.
3126 at § 1022(g) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed as conferring
authority on the Agency to establish a usury limit applicable to an extension of
credit offered or made by a covered person to a customer").
11 Stephen Bernard, Regulators Take Over 2 Banks; 94 Failures This
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of comprehensive systemic failure in the financial industry,
combined with an elite group of TBTF banks has led to even
more industry-wide consolidation. °° Before the crisis, investment
banks were separated from commercial banks and while they
were systemically interconnected, they were different
institutions."' Now, this relatively small number of investment
and commercial institutions has largely partnered up to further
reduce the number of big bank players in the market.0 2 The few
T1FHCs share a disproportionate amount of the financial
industry burden and their overall financial health is now essential
not just to the U.S. economy, but the global economy.'013
The remaining T1FHCs will use their customers to
subsidize the prudential standards of the reform plan that require
T1FHCs to be especially well capitalized. Consumers will pay for
T1FHC status through higher banking transaction fees, lower
interest rate yields on accounts, and higher interest rates on loans
of all varieties. Further, the consumers that will primarily finance
these prudential standards will be the ones that can least afford
them. These T1FHCs will impose hefty overdraft fees, late
payment charges, minimal balance requirements, additional loan
closing costs, and uncompetitive loan rates on their customers. In
fact, even though the proposal is not yet law, banks are already
doing this. In 2009, banks will collect over $38 billion in special
charges and overdraft fees paid by customers.104 The largest
banks are charging the highest fees.' In order to continue
Year, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-ap-us-bank-
closures,0,6099722.story (as of September 18, ninety-four banks have failed in
2009, and the "number of banks on the FDIC's confidential "problem list"
jumped to 416 at the end of June from 305 in the first quarter [which is] the
highest number since June 1994 ... The [FDIC] insurance fund has been so
depleted by the epidemic of collapsing financial institutions that some analysts
have warned it could sink into the red by the end of this year").
'o Cho, supra note 33.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
14 Saskia Scholtes & Francesco Guerra, Banks Make $38bn From
Overdraft Fees, FIN. TIMES, August 9, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43d 18c68-851 d- Il de-9a64-
00144feabdc.html?nclickcheck=1 ("US banks stand to collect a record
$38.5bn in fees for customer overdrafts this year, with the bulk of the revenue
coming from the most financially stretched consumers . . . fees are nearly
double those reported in 2000").
101 Scholtes & Guerra, supra note 104 ("[t]he highest overdraft fees were
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recruiting and maintaining their most valued clients, large banks
will have to immunize certain classes of clients from all of these
extra fees and instead pass the burden along to the average
financial industry consumer. 10 6 Consequently, the consumers that
can least afford it will be financing TBTF financial institutions'
new fee-based practices of raising capital. 17 This process is
already underway as a natural byproduct of self-imposed
repentant leveraging restrictions on TBTF companies that create
diseconomies of scale. The only difference under the proposal is
that the process will be implicitly codified through strict
prudential standards.
As it currently stands, consumers have few options to
avoid abuse by large financial institutions. By allowing smaller
banks to fail and bailing out large banks, two things happen: i)
the assets of small failed banks are ultimately sold off to larger
institutions through the receivership process, and ii) the
government reinforces the idea of safety for the consumer in
choosing a large bank. When viewed together, these results
necessarily lead to ever increasing industry consolidation because
banks want to achieve T1FHC status and consumers want to
keep their money in the safest places possible.
A. FDIC Receivership Fails the Consumer When Unevenly
Applied
FDIC receivership encourages consolidation and creates
larger banks automatically. When some banks are given the
privilege of TBTF status and others are not, those with TBTF
status will always prevail. Further, TBTF status banks are likely
candidates to absorb the assets of failed smaller banks. While
many banks were involved in subprime mortgages and
charged by the largest banks.., banks with assets greater than $50bn - a
group including Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells
Fargo;" these banks have a current median overdraft fee of $33 compared to
the current industry average of $26, and Bank of American customers have it
the worst, where customer overdrawn by $6 could trigger a total penalty of
$350 in a single day).
116 Id. ("[t]the most cash-strapped customers are the hardest hit by such
fees, with 90 per cent of overdraft revenues coming from 10 per cent of [US
checking accounts] ... Regular use of overdrafts is most common among
consumers with low credit scores").
107 Id. ("[b]anks are returning to a fee-driven model and overdraft fees are
the mother lode ... Overdraft fees accounted for more than three-quarters of
service fees charged on consumer deposits").
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securitized risk investments over the last five years, it was the
largest banks that received extraordinary government support in
the form of direct capital injections,'08 while smaller banks were
left to languish in FDIC receivership only to be dismantled and
have their assets sold off to the same TBTF institutions receiving
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") capital injections. If
FDIC receivership is to be taken seriously, it must apply to all
banks, not just ones deemed small enough to fail. By maintaining
a two-tiered banking system (TBTF and everyone else), the
government stacks the deck in favor of the TBTF financial
institution because they are the likely buyers of failed banks'
assets that have been scrubbed clean in FDIC receivership. The
regulatory reform plan attempts to reconcile this inequity by
maintaining that bankruptcy will be mandatory for critically
undercapitalized T1FHCs. 10  However, Title II does not
specifically bar future bailout resources, and in fact implies that if
T1FHCs uphold the requirements of Title II, they will be
protected from failure because of their unique attributes to the
economy's survival.
B. TBTF Drives the Rational Consumer to Suboptimal but
Safe Banks
The consumer will want to bank at T1FHCs because
there is greater perceived safety. Despite the suboptimal banking
conditions for the average consumer, through TBTF status, the
government incentivizes consumers who put up with TBTF
banks by impliedly insuring those banks against their own risk. A
rational consumer would seek to house their savings with a bank
that affords the greatest security against loss. While even small
banks have FDIC deposit insurance, there is a general comfort in
knowing that not only your money is safe with your bank, but
also your bank is safe against failure. Actions by the federal
government over the last year have taught the consumer that the
largest financial institutions are protected through government
intervention because of the risk they pose to the overall stability
to the economy. Smaller banks, by contrast, are sent to FDIC
receivership where larger banks swallow up the good assets of the
failed small bank. While the consumer does not lose their
... Broome, supra note 46, at 142-43) (discussing the largest TARP fund
recipients, in particular the secondary capital infusions to save Citibank and
Bank of America).
109 BHC Act 2009, supra note 64, at § 6A (h) (1).
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personal funds when a bank fails, they may have to deal with
branch closings as the purchaser of the failed bank's assets
eliminates redundancies in specific markets. Additionally, the
customer at the failed bank has no say in which larger financial
institution purchases the right to their account. Here again, the
planned regulatory reform fails to address the inequity between
treatment of TBTF and small banking institutions, thereby
creating a subconscious consumer bias towards TBTF financial
institutions.
Finally, consumers will have fewer options of where to
bank. T1FHCs will use their market share and power to
dominate markets creating fewer options for consumers and
greater incentive for T1FHCs to impose more fees. An already-
demonstrated result of the 2008 financial crisis is an increase in
consolidation within the banking industry. The largest TARP
fund recipients essentially went on a merger frenzy immediately
following distribution of the funds. Further, the government's
response to the extraordinary collapse of the financial market was
to not only permit more consolidation, but to encourage it.110 The
result of the financial crisis was fewer small and mid-size banks,
and increased market share for the surviving large banks. Title II
in no way addresses this increasing inequity in the industry.
Increasingly, consumers are left with fewer choices than ever of
where to bank, and are forced to put up with inefficient and
abusive banking practices as TARP fund recipients pull
themselves out of their own mess by raising fees while decreasing
service. It is difficult to argue how, in the long run, inefficiently
run market-dominating oligopolies will benefit the consumer.
V. Conclusion
What does this mean for TBTF banks? This country's
largest financial institutions may have to face the reality that they
will be unable meet both the prudential standards set forth in
Title II of the reform plan, and the regulatory standards proposed
to protect consumers in Title X. If TBTF financial institutions
are unable to capitalize themselves with consumer fees and the
mortgage lending and investing practices of the past are shut off,
they may not be able to overcome their diseconomies of scale and
will be forced to fragment. Recently, we have already begun to
see movement in Congress to reform banking fee practices."'
110 Stewart, supra note 6, at 74.
... Stacy Kaper, Dodd Preps Bill to Limit Fees on Overdrafts, AM.
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Empirical analyses indicate there is a great deal of public support
for bank fee reform, and legislators may not have much trouble
passing new restrictive legislation because their electorates want
it.1 2 Three large banks have already responded in anticipation of
Congressional rebuke by easing some of their overdraft fees."13
However, the bottom line is that the big bank lobby is an
undeniable force in politics. It is highly centralized, exceedingly
organized, and extremely well-funded. This stands in stark
contrast to the consumer, who is widely dispersed, poorly
organized, and lacks funding resources. Where there is a-will,
there is a way, and the big bank lobby has a continued vested
interest in promoting TBTF status in the financial industry. The
regulatory reform proposal lacks the tenacity required to end the
cycle of regulatory influence by financial elites in politics. Instead,
it proposes a considerate but ultimately ill-equipped consumer
protection agency. Further, it favors a strong status-quo bias by
simply imposing a new set of regulations through a new
government agency in Title II, which merely adds to the
ineptitude of previous legislative acts that have already proved
inadequate to prevent financial calamities created at the hands of
TBTF companies.
Instead, the Administration should focus on ending TBTF
privileges by forcing divestiture of financial institutions that pose
systemic risk to the economy. Also, regulators should concentrate
BANKER, Sept. 18, 2009, available at
http:/Iwww.americanbanker.com/issues/174_180/dodd-preps-bill-to-limitfee
s-on-overdrafts-1002159-1.html (discussing how overdraft fee reform is
"rapidly gaining momentum on Capitol Hill" where proposals to create an opt
in policy with greater transparency and proportional fees could pass as early as
this year. Bankers explain that "restricting overdraft fees would hit
institutions... [because] it's hard to make money in straight banking, so you
have to have fee-based activities." However, banks may have an uphill battle
to fight as politicians such as Charles Schumer have publicly concluded that
"debit cardholders are getting scammed by their banks").
112 Id.
13 Candace Choi, As banks ease up on overdraft fees, customers could see
new fees, products elsewhere, S.F. ExAM'R, Sept. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.sfexaminer.com/economy/ap/60634867.html("Bank of America
customers will no longer be charged overdraft fees when a customer's account
is overdrawn by less than $10 a day. A $35 fee will still be levied if the account
isn't brought into balance within five days... JPMorgan Chase says it won't
charge fees when accounts are overdrawn by $5 of less. The maximum
number of fees per day will be lowered to three from six... [Wells Fargo] will
not charge a fee if a customer overdraws an account by $5 or less, and will only
charge that fee up to four times per day").
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on preventing new TBTF financial institutions from forming.
Rather than codifying TBTF in the financial industry under the
T1FHC label and imposing an enhanced set of prudential
standards for creative banking attorneys to work around, the
government should explicitly promise an end to taxpayer
subsidies for negligently-managed financial institutions. TBTF
banks show a continued flagrant disregard for consumer
interests, and now is the time for real reform. There is an
abundance of public outrage about how TARP fund recipients
spent taxpayer dollars to overcharge their own customers in the
wake of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Lawmakers should capitalize on this outrage by passing
meaningful legislation while they still have support in the court of
public opinion.
Unfortunately, I fear that politicians lack the resolve and
are too easily swayed by lobbyists. It is unlikely that the
consumer will see an end to TBTF financial institutions. As
demonstrated by the largely toothless proposed FSOC agency,
even the Administration that ran on the idea of change is unable
or unwilling to take the steps necessary to protect the consumer
and the taxpayer from big banks. Title X of the reform proposal
does not reconcile the implied authorization of Title II that
impliedly permits T1FHCs to survive at all costs. Without
sufficiently curbing the methods by which T1FHCs stay well-
capitalized, the consumer can expect a variety of suboptimal
banking conditions such as decreased or impersonal service,
higher costs, more fees, and lower annual percentage yields on
deposit accounts. Combine these disservices with additional
consolidation and the result is markedly fewer banking options
for consumers. Plus, since the government has already shown
exceptional willingness .to bail out large financial institutions
while letting smaller ones fail, even those consumers with good
alternative banking options may be inclined to put up with
abusive practices at TBTF banks because of the subconscious
security of government backing.
In sum, the regulatory reform proposal represents more of
the status quo of banking policy of the last thirty years disguised
as effective reform. Certainly, the consumer can count on some
improvements as a result of this legislation, but ultimately this
plan only works to forestall future economic calamities by TBTF
financial institutions. In the meanwhile, the plan promotes a less-
than-ideal banking environment for the average consumer.
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